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Partisanship and local fiscal policy:
evidence from Brazilian cities.∗
Raphael Gouvêa† r⃝ Daniele Girardi‡
Abstract
We study the role of partisanship in shaping local fiscal policy in Brazilian cities in the 2004-
2016 period. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we find no effect of left-wing mayors on the
size of the city government nor on the allocation of spending across main budget categories (cur-
rent spending, investment and personnel). We do find a modest, significant and robust positive
effect of approximately 0.6 percentage points on the social expenditures share. We investigate
mechanisms and find that re-election concerns and institutional constraints can explain the lim-
ited extent of spending allocation effects, while Tiebout-competition does not seem to play a
role.
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1 Introduction
Do political parties matter when it comes to governing cities? The classical Downsian model
predicts policy convergence between parties (Downs, 1957). However, convergence can fail when
parties/candidates are ideologically motivated and represent different constituencies (Alesina, 1987,
1988; Besley and Coate, 1997). While these broad theoretical considerations apply to all government
levels, municipalities present some specificity, due to their different political, legal and economic
environment (Peterson 1981; Ferreira and Gyourko 2009, pp. 401-403). A recent literature has
studied this issue empirically in the US and other industrialized countries, finding that partisan
control of a city government has some effect on local policies and outcomes in some European
countries (Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008; Fiva et al., 2018), but not in the US (Ferreira and Gyourko,
2009).
This paper studies the effect of partisanship on local fiscal policy in the context of a developing
country. Specifically, we study Brazilian municipalities and estimate the effect of electing a left-wing
mayor on various fiscal policy variables through a regression-discontinuity design.
Overall, our baseline results point to substantial (but not complete) fiscal policy convergence
between political parties in Brazilian cities. We find no effect of left-wing mayors on the size of
the city government nor on the allocation of spending across the main budget categories (current
spending, investment and personnel). We do find a modest, significant and robust positive effect on
the share of social expenditures. The (close) election of a left-wing mayor tends to raise the share
of social expenditures by around 0.6 percentage points in our preferred RD specification.
We then explore potential mechanisms which may limit partisan effects in Brazilian cities. Main-
stream parties may just not have fundamentally different ideological views when it comes to local
fiscal policy. Or they may have different ideological views on this matter, but their policy space
may be constrained. Previous literature and our reading of the institutional context suggest three
possible types of constraints. The first is re-election concerns, consistent with models of Downsian
competition with reputation-building (eg Enelow and Munger (1993), Besley and Case (1995)). The
second is institutional rigidities regarding the tax revenue system and the allocation of public ex-
penditures. The third is Tiebout-type competition among local jurisdictions, which previous studies
have found to be important in bringing about policy convergence in US municipalities (Ferreira and
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Gyourko, 2009).
We propose empirical tests for these explanations. To assess the role of re-election concerns,
we restrict the analysis to ‘lame-duck’ mayors, who face a binding term limit and are therefore less
constrained by electoral competition in pursuing their agenda. To test the ‘institutional constraints’
hypothesis, we exploit exogenous changes in these constraints provided by ‘oil windfalls’. In Brazil, a
subset of oil-producing municipalities experience sharp fluctuations in revenues due to fluctuations in
oil production and prices. If partisan effects are limited by institutional constraints, we would expect
to find larger effects when these constraints are relaxed by oil-related revenue windfalls. Following
the US literature (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009), we test the ‘Tiebout-competition’ hypothesis by
building a Herfindahl index, measuring the presence of potentially competing locations in the same
local area, and test whether the impact of partisanship covaries with this index.
Our results suggest that none of these mechanisms explain the lack of partisan effects on the
size of government. This suggests limited ideological differences between mainstream parties on this
topic. This interpretation appears consistent with both survey evidence on the policy preferences
of Brazilian politicians (Zucco and Power, 2018) and studies of the evolution of the policy proposals
of the Workers’ Party (PT), the leading Brazilian left party (Campello, 2016).
However, institutional constraints and re-election concerns do appear to explain the limited
extent of budget composition effects. In cities where institutional constraints are relaxed by oil
windfalls, left-wing mayors raise the share of social expenditures by around 2.4 percentage points,
a fourfold increase compared to the baseline results. Moreover, in this subsample we also find a
marginally significant effect of around 1.4 percentage points on the share of personnel expenditures.
We also find a larger effect on the share of social expenditures among ‘lame-duck’ mayors (0.97
percentage points versus 0.60 in the baseline). We do not find support for the Tiebout-competition
hypothesis.
1.1 Related literature
Some recent papers have used regression-discontinuity designs (RDDs) to study the causal effect
of political partisanship on city-level fiscal policy and other outcomes. These studies have pointed
to significant effects of left-wing parties on the size and composition of the city budget in Nordic
European countries (Norway and Sweden), but no effect of Democrat mayors in US cities. Little
2
evidence has been available so far on developing countries.1
Specifically, Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) finds that left-wing city governments in Sweden increase
the municipal budget, employ more workers, and reduce the local unemployment rate relative to
conservative ones. Folke (2014) adapts the regression-discontinuity framework to study the role of
small parties in proportional representation systems, finding large effects of party representation in
Swedish municipal councils on immigration and environmental policy, but not taxes.
Fiva et al. (2018) estimate the effect of both government control and party representation in
Norwegian cities. They find that a conservative city government lowers property taxes, but has no
impact on spending allocations, and that an increase in the seats of left-wing parties leads to higher
childcare spending and lower elderly care spending.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) find no partisan differences in policy outcomes between Democrat
and Republican mayors in US cities. They investigate possible explanations, and find most support
for Tiebout-competition among municipalities within metropolitan areas. This paper is the closest
to ours in the sense of studying a majoritarian system in which a directly-elected mayor is the head
of the city government.
A broader literature has studied partisan effects at the regional and national level on various
outcomes. Lee et al. (2004) exploit close US congressional elections to show that the electoral
strength of a legislator does not affect her voting behavior, suggesting that voters elect (rather than
affecting) parties’ policy positions. Leigh (2008) studies US States in the 1941-2002 period and
finds partisan effects on post-tax inequality, unemployment, incarceration rates, minimum wages
and welfare caseloads, but no impact on taxes, public employment and crime rates. Beland and
Oloomi (2017) study the effect of the party affiliation of US Governors on fiscal policy, finding no
effect on total spending but some differences in the allocation of funds, with Democratic governors
allocating a larger share to health and education. In a related study, Beland (2015) finds that
Democratic governors tend to cause reductions in racial gaps in employment and earnings. Other
studies have looked at the effect of partisan electoral victories on financial markets (eg Snowberg
et al. (2007); Girardi (2018)).
1Most previous work on partisan effects in developing countries lacks a clear identification strategy, as the one
provided by a RDD. It is hard, therefore, to rule out endogeneity biases in these previous work. For Brazil, for
example, there are a few studies using panel regression with party dummies to study partisanship effects on fiscal
policy at the local level (Sakurai, 2009; Sakurai and Menezes-filho, 2011; Sakurai and Gremaud, 2007).
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2 Institutional Context
Brazil is a federal republic with three autonomous and independent administrative levels: the
federal government, 27 states (including the federal district) and 5,570 municipalities. Brazilian
municipalities have an executive and a legislative branch. The mayor is directly elected by plurality
or majority rule and the city council by proportional rule. Local elections happen every 4 years in
October and the elected mayor and city council start their mandate in January 1st of the following
year. Municipal elections are always two year apart from federal and state elections, which happen
at the same time. In municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters, there is only one round for
electing the mayor. In larger cities, there is a runoff between the two most voted candidates if none
of them achieves an absolute majority in the first round. Mayors face a two-term limit.
Brazil is a case of multipartism, with 33 registered and roughly 14 effective parliamentary parties
in 2016 (Nicolau, 2017; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008).2 Four parties, however, have played a major
role in the period under study. The social-democratic, pro-Labor Worker’s Party (PT) is dominant
on the left and has won four consecutive presidential elections since 2002. The PT has moved
towards the center during its bid to the 2002 presidential campaign (Campello, 2016). The leftist
camp also includes smaller communist, socialist and green parties. PSDB and PMDB are the main
center-right parties, while DEM/PFL is the most important party on the right (Zucco and Power,
2009, 2018). Appendix A provides the full list of parties that participated in the municipal elections
we study.
The current constitution, enacted in 1988, promoted an important decentralization of the admin-
istrative structure, leading to an increase in the responsibility of city governments in the provision
of public goods. The main areas under municipal responsibility are education (child care and pri-
mary), basic health services, provision of infrastructure in sanitation, transportation and urban
planning.
Even though many expenditure categories have been decentralized to cities, tax collection con-
tinues to be rather centralized at the federal and state level. As a consequence, municipalities
have relatively low self-financing capacity and are highly dependent on intergovernmental transfers,
2 The effective number of parliamentary parties is a standard measure of political fragmentation in comparative
politics, and is computed using the number of parties in parliament weighted by parties’ vote shares (Laakso and
Taagepera, 1979; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2008).
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which accounted for 58 percent of all municipal revenues in 2016. Most of these revenues come from
block-grant/earmarked transfer programs and a smaller share in the form of discretionary transfers.
Since the enactment of the Law of Fiscal Responsibility in 2000, municipalities (as well as other
levels of government) face strong restrictions in their levels of deficit and debt.
Importantly, in Brazilian municipalities (as well as at the federal and state level) the executive
branch has a dominant role in crafting, approving and executing the budget. The role of the city
council is mostly confined to amending limited parts of the budget bill crafted by the executive and,
after spending has occurred, auditing and reviewing municipal spending. Moreover, given that in
Brazil the budget law is not mandatory but just authoritative, the executive has large flexibility
in deciding whether to execute or not each amendment approved by the city council (Alston et al.,
2005; Albuquerque et al., 2013).
3 Data
We combine electoral results from the 2004, 2008 and 2012 Brazilian municipal elections with data
on several public finance outcomes. Our sample includes 9,679 municipal elections for which we can
calculate the left’s margin of victory/loss (the running variable in our RDD) and have data on the
fiscal policy outcomes of interest over the full post-election mayoral term.
3.1 Electoral results and partisanship
Data on municipal elections come from Brazil’s Electoral Court - Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE).
We focus on the 2004, 2008 and 2012 elections, as data from previous elections is either unavailable
or incomplete.3 From TSE, we obtain information on the candidate party, the composition of her
coalition and the number of votes. With this information, we can compute the running variable in
our RDD: the left’s margin of victory/loss, defined as the vote share of the most voted left-wing
candidate minus the vote share of the most voted non-left candidate. In case of a runoff, we use
the runoff vote shares to compute the margin of victory. We use the Zucco and Power (2018)
classification to determine the ideological stance of parties (left or non-left). When a party is not
included in Zucco and Power (2018), we use other sources to assign party ideology. The partisanship
3As stated in the website of the data repository (accessed in April 2019).
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classification is detailed in Appendix A.
3.2 Public finance
Public finance data come from Brazil’s National Treasury - Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional (STN).
Municipalities report detailed information on expenditures and revenues to STN, which then pub-
lishes the dataset Finanças do Brasil - Dados Contábeis dos Municípios (FINBRA). We use total
revenues and total expenditures per capita and as a share of GDP as our measures of government
size. We also study how the allocation of expenditures among the main budget and functional
categories is affected by party ideology. For the budget categories, we use current expenditures,
personnel and investment as a share of total expenditures. Given the main areas under responsi-
bility of municipalities, we study the allocation of functional categories in two groups: social and
non-social expenditures. We define social expenditures as expenditures in health and sanitation,
education and culture, and social welfare programs. Other expenditures are composed of housing
and urban development, transportation and others, the latter being a residual group that includes
all other functional categories.4 To create a sample of oil-windfall receivers (used in mechanisms’
analysis), we use information from the Transferêncas Constitucionais from STN. This database
reports all non-discretionary transfers made by the central government to states and municipalities.
3.3 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
We take a number of steps to create our baseline sample. We start with all 16,685 municipal
electoral results available in the TSE repository. We exclude 258 elections which occurred after
the regular schedule. After computing the left’s margin of victory/loss, the running variable in our
RDD, we are left with 10,789 elections. Concerning the outcome variables, even though FINBRA is
an unbalanced panel dataset, it has a coverage rate of at least 93 percent of the municipalities per
year. We exclude 580 observations from FINBRA because municipalities have not reported total
revenues or total, current or capital expenditures. Moreover, we only keep observations for which
we can observe all outcome variables over the full term. As a result, our baseline sample has 9,679
observations, where an observation is a municipality-election cycle. We supplement our data with
4The OECD includes pensions in the social expenditure categories (OECD, 2007). Given that pension expenditures
are mostly pre-determined for the current mayor, as they are the result of hiring and wage setting decisions from
previous administrations, we decide to include pensions in the residual group.
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information on municipal GDP, population and a set of demographic and geographic covariates.
Table B.1 reports descriptive statistics, in the whole sample and in the sub-samples we use to
analyze mechanisms. Even though these sub-samples select observations following different criteria
(discussed in detail in next sections), overall they display similar characteristics as the baseline
sample, except for geographic location.
4 Research design
We employ a regression-discontinuity design (RDD) (Hahn et al., 2001) to identify the effect of a
mayor’s partisanship on local fiscal policy. Intuitively, we estimate a causal effect by comparing
municipalities with closely-elected left-wing mayors with municipalities where the left-wing candi-
date barely lost the election. More formally, we test whether the expected values of our fiscal policy
variables of interest display a discontinuity when the left margin crosses the victory threshold.
4.1 Regression-discontinuity specification
Our estimator of interest, which gives the effect of a left-wing mayor on fiscal policy variable y, is
given by
β = lim
ml↓0
E[y|ml]− lim
ml↑0
E[y|ml] (1)
where ml is the margin of victory/loss of the left candidate, defined as the difference between the
vote share of the most-voted left-wing candidate and the vote share of the most-voted non-left
candidate.
Our key identification assumption is that unobserved confounding factors – variables affecting
both election probabilities and fiscal policy choices – do not ‘jump’ discontinuously around the
threshold.5 This means that cities where the left candidate barely wins an election do not tend to
be abruptly different from cities where the left barely loses. Under this ‘smoothness’ assumption, our
RD estimator identifies the causal effect of a (closely-elected) left mayor on fiscal policy variables.
We estimate β through the following RD specification:
yit = β1{mlit > 0}+ f(mlit) + αi + τt + εit (2)
5More precisely, the assumption is that counterfactual outcomes are continuous in the running variable.
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where i and t index city and election year; y is a public finance variable measured as an average
over the after-election mayoral term, that is, from year t + 1 until year t + 4 (see Section 2); ml
is the left’s margin of victory/loss; f(.) is a potentially non-linear function that we approximate
through kernel-weighted local linear regression; αi and τt are city and year fixed effects.6 We use
the Calonico et al. (2014) robust and bias-corrected estimator.
4.2 Design assessment
Results reported in Appendix C support the validity of our RD design. Figure C.1 shows that there
is no evidence of electoral manipulation, as we do not find a discontinuity in the distribution of the
running variable at the cutoff (McCrary, 2008). Table C.1 displays differences in pre-determined
city characteristics between left and non-left mayors. The first column includes all elections in the
sample, showing that in general cities electing a leftist mayor are different: they are more likely to
be urban and in the northeast region, they have a lower share of white population, lower incomes
and lower labor force participation. The subsequent columns show that these differences disappear
if we restrict the comparison to progressively closer elections. Most importantly, column 6 estimates
differences in pre-determined city characteristics using the same RD specification that we employ
for estimating fiscal policy effects (equation 2), finding that all differences are both economically
and statistically insignificant around the threshold.
5 Main results: impact of partisanship on local fiscal policy
This section presents our main results, which are reported in column 1 of Table 1 and displayed
graphically in Figure 1. As explained in Section 4, all outcomes are measured as an average over
the four years in office. Overall, we find no significant effect of left-wing mayors on the size of
the city government nor on the allocation of expenditures across main economic categories (current
spending, investment and personnel). We do find a modest significant positive effect on the social
6 We control for city and year fixed effects by first regressing yit on city and year dummies, and then using residuals
from this fixed-effects regression as the left-hand variable in our RD estimation. In the interest of efficiency, this ‘first-
step’ fixed-effects regression uses the whole sample, including observations which are excluded from the RD estimation
because the ‘left margin’ variable is not available. Our results do not change if we restrict the first-step regression to
exactly the same sample used in the RD estimation. For details on this two-steps procedure, see Lee and Lemieux
(2010, p. 331-333).
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expenditures share.
5.1 Size of government
We proxy the size of city governments using their total revenues and expenditures, per capita and
as a share of municipal GDP.
We find no significant partisan effects on the size of city government: there is no discontinuity
at the threshold for any of the four proxies (top panel of Table 1, column 1; Figure 1, panels (a) to
(d)).
[Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here]
5.2 Budget composition
We now study how partisanship affects the allocation of resources. First, we look at the composition
of expenditures across the main budget categories. Again, we find no significant effects: there is
no evidence of discontinuities in the shares of current spending, personnel and investments in total
spending (middle panel of Table 1, column 1; Figure 1, panels (e) to (g)).
Second, we look at the composition of expenditures across the main functions of government. We
find a modest positive discontinuity in the share of social expenditures (Figure 1, panel (h)). The
share of social spending is higher by 0.6 percentage points under a left-wing mayor, with p < 0.01
(bottom panel of Table 1, column 1). The ‘Health & Sanitation’ and ‘Education & Culture’ sectors
account for most of this effect. All other categories seem to adjust to accommodate the increase in
social expenditures: we do not find any single item among non-social expenditures which tends to
be disproportionately penalized.
To assess how this reallocation translates into an increase in the level of social spending, we
report results for the effect on social spending per capita (bottom panel of Table 1, column 1, and
top panel of Figure 2). We find that social spending per capita increases by around 1 percent.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
In order to uncover dynamics, Appendix D reports results by year in office. The key finding is
summarized in Figure 3: the effect on the social expenditures share increases gradually, reaching
9
0.95 percentage points in the last year in office, consistent with the idea that it takes time to
reallocate resources. Effects on size of government and budget categories are confirmed to be small
and insignificant for all years in office (Table D.1).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
5.3 Robustness tests
Appendix E reports robustness tests. Table E.1 restricts the analysis to progressively larger cities,
up to the 90th percentile. Results are remarkably stable, indicating that heterogeneous effects
by city size cannot account for our results. Table E.2 re-estimates equation 2 using alternative
bandwidth selection criteria. Results are insensitive to bandwidth choice.
5.4 Falsification exercise
Given that we find a significant effect only on social expenditures, and that this effect is economically
modest, we ask how likely it is to be the artifact of a tendency of our estimated RD specification to
over-reject the null hypothesis, or of some failure of our identification assumptions. To assess this
possibility, we perform the following falsification test. We randomly draw 200 placebo thresholds, a
hundred from each side of the true threshold, and re-estimate equation 2 with the social expenditures
share as the outcome variable and using a placebo threshold instead of the true threshold. In order
to avoid mis-specification, we only include in the estimations observations from the same side of
the true threshold. We consider only placebo thresholds that guarantee at least 25 observations in
each side of the bandwidth to avoid biasing the the test against significant findings due to weak
statistical power.
Figure 4 plots the distribution of t-statistics from the regressions using randomly-drawn placebo
thresholds. There is no evidence of a tendency to find significant discontinuities away from the true
threshold. Moreover, the t-statistics from our baseline estimations at the true threshold (vertical
dashed lines) are in the tails of the distribution of placebo t-statistics and are consistent with levels
of significance below 5 percent.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
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Overall, the results presented in this section point to very limited partisanship effects in mu-
nicipal fiscal policy. We now turn to the question of why this is the case and explore possible
mechanisms that may help explain the substantial degree of fiscal policy convergence in Brazilian
cities.
6 Mechanisms: what accounts for substantial fiscal policy conver-
gence in Brazilian cities?
This section explores potential explanations for the rather limited partisan effects we have found.
Our analysis below suggests that policy divergence in the allocation of spending is limited by both
institutional constraints and re-election concerns. In contrast with previous evidence for the US,
Tiebout competition does not seem to play a significant role in our sample.
6.1 Re-election concerns
Political competition is a natural candidate explanation for policy convergence, in the spirit of the
classic Downsian model. We test this explanation by restricting the analysis to ‘lame-duck’ mayors,
who cannot run for re-election because of term-limits. Of course, this does not eliminate politi-
cal competition effects altogether – ‘lame-duck’ mayors may still care about their party/coalition
winning the next election, or about their own reputation, for example in view of running for other
offices – but it can weaken them significantly.
Results are consistent with re-election concerns playing a role in limiting budget composition
effects (column 2 of Table 1 and middle panel of Figure 2). In the sub-sample with ‘lame-duck’
mayors, partisan effects on the share of social expenditures are indeed moderately larger than in
the whole sample (0.97 versus 0.60 percentage points). Furthermore, in terms of social expenditures
per capita, effects are almost three times larger in this subsample (3.3 versus only 1 percent in the
baseline sample). In contrast, the effect on the size of the city government remains non-significant,
suggesting that for this variable absence of partisan effects is not driven by re-election concerns.
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6.2 Tiebout competition
Competition between cities within a geographical area (‘Tiebout competition’) may limit the policy
space of mayors if residents can easily move to nearby cities (Tiebout, 1956; Peterson, 1981). Ferreira
and Gyourko (2009) find evidence that this mechanism can explain policy convergence between
Democrat and Republican mayors in US cities.
To test this hypothesis, we follow Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) in building a proxy for the inten-
sity of Tiebout competition faced by each city in our sample. This measure of Tiebout competition
is a Herfindahl index of the adult population (at least 16 years old) in each city within a commuting
zone. This is calculated as the sum of the squares of the shares of population of the municipalities
inside the same commuting zone (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009, 417). A low value for this index
indicates high Tiebout competition: many cities of small relative size within the same commuting
zone; symmetrically, a high value signals low competition.
To assess whether Tiebout competition can explain our baseline results, we restrict the analysis
to cities facing low Tiebout competition. Under the hypothesis that Tiebout competition explains
policy convergence, we expect larger partisan effects in these cities. Column 3 of table 1 reports
our RD specification in cities with below-median Tiebout competion (Herfindahl index above the
median), while column 4 focuses on cities with Tiebout competition below the 25th percentile
(Herfindahl index above the 75th percentile).
Overall, we do not find support for the Tiebout competition hypothesis. Effects on the size
of government and on distribution among functional categories remain insignificant. Effects on
the share of social expenditures get moderately larger in the sample with below-median Tiebout
competition, but smaller in the sample with below-25th-percentile competition. Moreover, we find
little effect on social expenditures per capita in both these subsamples (Table 1). These results are
inconsistent with the Tiebout-competition hypothesis, which predicts that partisan effects should
grow in size as the intensity of Tiebout competition gets lower.
6.3 Institutional constraints
As discussed in Section 2, Brazilian mayors appear to face strong institutional constraints on their
fiscal policy decisions: laws regulating local public finance, limited tax capacity, and hardwired
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expenditures. If binding, these constraints may help explain limited policy divergence.
To test this hypothesis, we look at cities and periods in which institutional constraints are exoge-
nously relaxed by ‘oil-windfalls’: large increases in revenues due to royalties from oil production.7
If policy divergence is limited by institutional constraints, we expect to find larger effects (larger
policy divergence) when these constraints are relaxed by oil windfalls.
Large oil windfalls are relatively common in our sample. Since the 1997 ‘New Oil Law’, compa-
nies must pay royalties amounting to 5 to 10 percent of oil output value, indexed at international
prices. Most of these royalties are allocated to local governments, following rules that dispropor-
tionately benefit a set of “oil producer” municipalities (990 in our sample period). Moreover, both
oil production and oil prices displayed large increases in the period we study, resulting in sudden
substantial relaxations of the budget constraints of ‘oil producing’ cities.
Importantly, cities are relatively free in allocating revenues from oil royalties, with only two
restrictions: these revenues cannot be directly used to hire new public employees on a permanent
basis, nor to pay public debt. Caselli and Michaels (2013) show that on average (independent
of partisanship) oil revenues tend to increase municipal spending on housing, urban development,
transportation, education, health and transfers to households.
To identify a subsample of oil windfall receivers, we use the growth rate of average oil royalties
received over an election cycle, i.e. over the mayoral term. We calculate this variable for each
municipality-election observation and define our oil-windfall receivers sample as those observations
above the median. In other words, a city-election enters our ‘oil-windfall subsample’ if there was a
large (above-median) increase in revenues from oil royalties during the after-election mayoral term.
This procedure leaves us with 1,335 observations. After we match these observations with our
baseline sample, we are left with a subsample of 893 city-elections.
Partisan effects on the budget composition are indeed much stronger in the presence of oil
windfalls (column 5 of Table 1 and bottom panel of Figure 2). The election of a left-wing mayor
raises the share of social expenditures by 2.4 percentage points in this setting – a fourfold increase
7 Caselli and Michaels (2013, pp. 117-221 and online appendix) argue that oil windfalls are exogenous and provide
details on the rules governing the allocation of oil royalties in Brazil. Note that our RD strategy does not rely
crucially on oil windfalls being exogenous: contrary to Caselli and Michaels (2013), we do not compare cities receiving
oil windfalls to cities not receiving them. Our comparison is between closely elected left and non-left mayors, within
the subset of cities receiving oil windfalls. What we assume is that oil production and oil prices are not affected by a
mayor’s fiscal policy choices and that heterogeneity in partisan effects between cities receiving oil windfalls and other
cities are due to oil windfalls and not to other differences.
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in the size of the effect relative to the baseline. The differential effect is even larger in terms of social
expenditures per capita: 8 versus only 1 percent in the baseline. Left-wing mayors also increase the
share of personnel expenditures by 1.4 percentage points in this subsample, even though this effect is
significant only at the 10 percent level. Given that we do not find any effects for the other economic
categories (current expenditure and public investment) and that cities cannot use oil revenues to
hire new public employees, it seems likely that pay rises account for most of this effect.8
The effect on the overall size of the city government, however, remains null as in all other
specifications and subsamples (column 5 of Table 1). This suggests that the absence of partisan
effects on government size is not driven by the strong institutional constraints faced by Brazilian
mayors, but rather by absence of underlying ideological differences between Brazilian mainstream
parties on this topic, although of course we cannot rule out alternative explanations based on
external constraints different from the ones we have been able to identify and measure.
6.4 Inference on differential impacts
We perform a simple bootstrap exercise to provide more information on the differential impacts
presented in our mechanisms’ analysis. For each mechanism, we estimate our RD specification
separately in the subsample of interest and in the rest of the sample.9 We then take the difference
between the two estimated effects and run 500 bootstrap replications to obtain standard errors
(clustered by municipality) for this difference.
The main finding from this exercise is that the differential budget-composition effect for oil-
windfall receivers is fairly precisely estimated, while the one for lame-duck mayors is noisier. Specif-
ically, we find that the effect on the social expenditures share is higher by 1.95 percentage points
for oil-windfall receivers relative to the rest of the sample, with a standard error of 0.99; it is higher
by 0.52 points (s.e. 0.47) for lame-duck mayors and by 0.77 points (s.e. 0.41) in cities with Tiebout
competition below median, but lower by 0.11 points (s.e. 0.41) in cities with Tiebout competition
8Even though we cannot directly test it, this interpretation seems in line with Caselli and Michaels (2013) results.
When they study the effects of oil windfalls on measures of real outcomes in the areas where they find spending
increases, the authors find no effect for most outcome variables. The only exception is the education sector where
oil-related-revenues are associated with increases in the number of teachers and classrooms per capita.
9This procedure is equivalent to using interaction terms to obtain differences in group effects in a parametric
regression. We perform a bootstrap exercise due to our non-parametric approach. Point estimates for differential
effects from this exercise are not equal to differences between coefficients from different columns of Table 1, because
here we take the difference between the subsample and the rest of the observations (excluding the subsample itself),
rather than between the subsample and the whole sample.
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below the 25th percentile. The differential effect on the share of personnel expenditures is 1.51
points (s.e. 0.93) for oil-windfall receivers.
6.5 Dynamics, robustness and placebo tests
Figure 3 and Appendices E and F report dynamic effects, robustness tests and placebo exercises
for our mechanisms’ analysis. Like baseline ones, results are robust to bandwidth selection criteria
and pass a falsification exercise using placebo thresholds. Moreover, social spending effects increase
gradually over time also in the ‘lame duck’ and ‘oil-windfall’ subsamples , and are larger compared
to the baseline for each single year in office (Figure 3).
7 Conclusions
This is the first study to provide causally identified evidence about the influence of political par-
tisanship on local fiscal policy in the context of a developing country. We study a large sample of
Brazilian municipalities in the 2004-2016 period and employ a regression-discontinuity design, thus
focusing on close mayoral elections.
We find no effect of left-wing mayors on the size of the city government, nor on the allocation
of spending across the main budget categories (current spending, investment and personnel), but a
small positive effect on the share of social expenditures. A left-wing mayor tends to raise the share
of social expenditures by around 0.6 percentage points relative to a non-left mayor in our preferred
RD specification. This reallocation results in a 1 percent increase in social spending per capita.
We then explore three potential mechanisms that may account for the lack of more substantial
partisan effects. Our results suggest that re-election concerns and institutional constraints play a
role in explaining the limited extent of budget composition effects. In cities that have their budget
constraint relaxed by an ‘oil windfall’, the positive impact of a left-wing mayor on the share of social
expenditures is four times larger than in the whole sample (around 2.4 percentage points), and there
is also a positive impact on the relative share of personnel expenses. Also in the subsample of cities
with ‘lame-duck’ mayors we find a larger effect on the share of social spending (0.97 percentage
points, compared to 0.60 in the whole sample). These differential effects are even larger in terms
of social expenditures per capita: on this variable with find a partisan effect of almost 8 percent
15
among oil-windfall receivers, and around 3 percent among ‘lame duck’ mayors, compared to just 1
percent in the whole sample. We find no empirical support for the Tiebout-competition hypothesis.
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Figure 1: Local fiscal policy indicators - baseline sample
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(c) Revenues per capita
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(e) Current expenditures
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(h) Social expenditures
Notes: Visual presentation of our RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor, reported in column 1 of table
1 and based on the specification in equation 2. All outcomes are 4-year term averages, residualized on city and
year fixed-effects. Fitted lines are estimated semi-parametrically through kernel-weighted local linear regression
(triangular kernel), with MSE-optimal bandwidth.
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Figure 2: Effect of a left-wing mayor on social spending
Baseline (whole sample)
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‘Lame-ducks’ subsample
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‘Oil-windfalls’ subsample
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Notes: Visual presentation of our RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor on social expenditures per capita
(left) and as share of total expenditures (right) for each subsample, as reported in columns 1, 2 and 5 of table
1 and based on the specification in equation 2. All outcomes are 4-year term averages, residualized on city and
year fixed-effects. Fitted lines are estimated semi-parametrically through kernel-weighted local linear regression
(triangular kernel), with MSE-optimal bandwidth. See main text for definition and interpretation of the subsamples.
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Figure 3: Social expenditure effects by year in office
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Notes: Effect of a left-wing mayor on the share of social spending from our RD specification (equation 2), using the
robust and bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Bars
represent 95% confidence intervals from robust bias-corrected standard errors clustered by municipality.
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Figure 4: Falsification test using placebo thresholds for the effect of a left-wing mayor on the social
expenditures share – whole sample
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Notes: Empirical distribution of t-statistics from our RD estimates (equation 2) of the effect of a left-wing mayor on
the share of social spending, based on 200 randomly-drawn placebo thresholds, drawn separately on the left and on
the right side of the true threshold (100 on each side), using only observations belonging to that side and with at least
25 observations on each side of the bandwidth. Vertical line = t-statistics obtained using the true threshold. The
t-statistics are from the robust bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014).
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Table 1: RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor
Outcome Baseline Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita -0.21 1.04 -1.19 -0.91 2.52
( 0.53) ( 1.18) ( 0.70) ( 0.90) ( 2.11)
Expenditure, % of GDP -0.02 -0.70 -0.16 -0.56 -0.61
( 0.21) ( 1.10) ( 0.33) ( 0.51) ( 0.46)
Revenue per capita 0.16 0.91 -0.41 0.38 1.87
( 0.49) ( 1.14) ( 0.74) ( 1.10) ( 2.05)
Revenue, % of GDP 0.09 -0.81 0.06 -0.25 -0.74
( 0.23) ( 1.11) ( 0.37) ( 0.57) ( 0.47)
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure -0.03 -0.29 -0.02 0.33 0.33
( 0.18) ( 0.37) ( 0.23) ( 0.34) ( 0.60)
Public Investment 0.05 0.26 0.11 -0.29 -0.39
( 0.18) ( 0.36) ( 0.20) ( 0.34) ( 0.61)
Personnel 0.09 -0.37 0.06 0.09 1.44
( 0.20) ( 0.41) ( 0.23) ( 0.33) ( 0.79)
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 0.60 0.97 0.92 0.45 2.36
( 0.20) ( 0.37) ( 0.27) ( 0.35) ( 0.91)
of which:
Health & sanitation 0.21 0.75 0.61 0.49 1.17
( 0.14) ( 0.24) ( 0.21) ( 0.27) ( 0.56)
Education & culture 0.19 0.04 -0.00 -0.20 1.10
( 0.15) ( 0.25) ( 0.19) ( 0.30) ( 0.54)
Social welfare 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.12 0.07
( 0.05) ( 0.10) ( 0.07) ( 0.09) ( 0.19)
Other expenditures:
Housing -0.18 -0.37 -0.05 0.02 -0.14
( 0.13) ( 0.29) ( 0.18) ( 0.25) ( 0.51)
Transportation -0.15 -0.16 -0.18 -0.11 -0.47
( 0.09) ( 0.18) ( 0.12) ( 0.16) ( 0.20)
Other -0.15 -0.63 -0.68 -0.33 -1.51
( 0.20) ( 0.34) ( 0.29) ( 0.36) ( 1.04)
Social Expenditures per capita 1.07 3.28 0.50 0.10 7.98
( 0.60) ( 1.29) ( 0.77) ( 1.12) ( 2.71)
Observations (all) 9679 2555 5418 3073 893
Observations (effective) 4898 1345 3173 2129 484
Lame ducks subsample ✓
Tiebout < median subsample ✓
Tiebout < 25th pct subsample ✓
Oil windfall subsample ✓
Notes: Estimates from our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Outcomes measured as 4-year averages over a mayoral
term. Robust and bias-corrected standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis.24
Online Appendix
Partisanship and local fiscal policy: evidence from
Brazilian cities
Raphael Gouvêa and Daniele Girardi
Appendix A Partisanship classification
This appendix provides information on how we assign party ideology. To calculate the left margin of victory, we
classify all parties that participated in the municipal elections of 2004, 2008 and 2012 as left or non-left (centrist,
right or neither). This is not an easy task given that Brazil has one of the most fragmented party system in the
world (Zucco and Power, 2018), with 33 registered parties in Brazil’s Electoral Court in 2018. Therefore, we base our
classification using previous literature and only assign party ideology based on other sources for a few cases. In what
follows we detail how candidate’s partisanship was coded.
First, we use Zucco and Power (2018, 2012, 2009)’s classification as our main source of party ideology. The
classification is based on eight waves of the Brazilian Legislative Surveys (BLS) that have been carried out by the
authors since the redemocratization of the country (Power and Zucco, 2011). The survey asks each legislator questions
that require them to position themselves and all main parties in the political system on a “left-right” scale. Based
on these answers, the authors create scores for each party in the “left-right” scale, where all parties to the left of PV
(PV inclusive) in the 2017 survey is classified as left and to the right as non-left (Zucco and Power, 2018, p. 5). We
classify 15 parties in this way.10
Second, we use Baker and Greene (2011) partisanship codes to classify other 12 parties. Baker and Greene (2011)
provides scores in the left-right scale for all parties in Latin America that participated in a presidential election
between 1995 and 2008.
Third, we follow Girardi (2018) and assign partisanship based on party international partisan association for all
other cases. All parties affiliated to the Socialist International, Foro de São Paulo, Party of European Socialists or
Progressive Alliance are coded as left. All the remaining parties are classified as non-left (centrist, right or neither).
Table A.1 reports the final classification with the respective source from which the party ideology was assigned.
10Even though party scores change for every survey-year, none of the parties switch from right to left (or the other
way around) of PV score for the year 2017.
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Table A.1: Party classification
Leftist parties Non-leftist parties
Party Source Party Source
PV Zucco and Power (2018) DEM/PFL Zucco and Power (2018)
PT Zucco and Power (2018) MDB/PMDB Zucco and Power (2018)
PSOL Zucco and Power (2018) PP Zucco and Power (2018)
PSB Zucco and Power (2018) PR Zucco and Power (2018)
PPS Zucco and Power (2018) PRB Zucco and Power (2018)
PDT Zucco and Power (2018) PSDB Zucco and Power (2018)
PCdoB Zucco and Power (2018) PSL Zucco and Power (2018)
PPL Foro de São Paulo PTB Zucco and Power (2018)
PSTU Baker and Greene (2011) PRONA Baker and Greene (2011)
PMN Baker and Greene (2011) PRP Baker and Greene (2011)
PCO Baker and Greene (2011) PRTB Baker and Greene (2011)
PCB Baker and Greene (2011) PSC Baker and Greene (2011)
DC/PSDC Baker and Greene (2011)
PODE/PTN Baker and Greene (2011)
PTdoB
PAN
PHS
PL
PSD
PTC
PEN
Leftist parties: Partido Verde (PV), Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL), Par-
tido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB), Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), Partido
Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB), Partido Pátria Livre (PPL), Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (PSTU),
Partido da Mobilização Nacional (PMN), Partido da Causa Operária (PCO), Partido Comunista Brasileiro (PCB).
Non-leftist parties: Democratas/Partido da Frente Liberal (DEM/PFL), Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/Partido
do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB/PMDB), Partido Progressista (PP), Partido da República (PR), Par-
tido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB), Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), Partido Social Liberal (PSL),
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (PRONA), Partido Republicano
Progressista (PRP), Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB), Partido Social Cristão (PSC), Democracia
Cristã/Partido Social Democrata Cristão (DC/PSDC), Podemos/Partido Trabalhista Nacional (PODE/PTN), Par-
tido Trabalhista do Brasil (PTdoB), Partido dos Aposentados da Nação (PAN), Partido Humanista da Solidariedade
(PHS), Partido Liberal (PL), Partido Social Democrático (PSD), Partido Trabalhista Cristão (PTC), Partido Ecológico
Nacional (PEN).
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Appendix B Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
Baseline Lame Duck Tiebout Tiebout Oil windfall
< median <25th perc.
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
Outcome variables
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita 8.11 69.08 10.88 65.05 10.47 68.99 10.06 68.43 10.72 70.52
Expenditure, % GDP 19.40 12.97 19.89 16.66 17.05 13.04 16.90 14.86 18.10 9.47
Revenue per capita 18.64 69.53 21.38 65.70 21.02 69.46 20.55 68.72 19.32 69.80
Revenue, % GDP 21.51 13.84 22.06 17.73 18.95 14.12 18.79 15.89 19.72 10.37
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure 88.21 4.89 87.42 5.15 87.85 5.02 87.68 5.16 89.10 5.12
Personnel 48.12 7.14 47.48 7.05 47.66 6.93 47.44 7.20 49.57 7.59
Public Investments 10.19 4.86 10.97 5.13 10.53 4.98 10.70 5.10 9.06 5.17
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 59.45 8.41 59.09 8.46 58.43 8.16 57.70 8.20 60.63 8.62
Health & sanitation 24.14 5.27 23.95 5.16 24.10 5.48 23.94 5.57 22.69 5.23
Education & culture 31.50 8.26 31.30 8.18 30.67 7.91 30.08 7.62 34.60 8.35
Social welfare 3.81 1.71 3.84 1.74 3.66 1.67 3.68 1.69 3.34 1.55
Housing 9.01 4.76 9.42 4.89 9.20 5.04 9.29 5.13 10.60 5.07
Transportation 3.62 4.33 3.56 4.33 3.71 4.40 3.72 4.45 1.30 1.88
Other 27.92 7.42 27.94 7.64 28.66 7.51 29.29 7.61 27.48 7.99
Demographics and geographic covariates
log(Population) 957.15 116.95 975.40 129.92 976.96 139.04 958.36 121.23 1,035.32 124.28
% Urban 62.45 23.64 65.09 24.76 65.42 25.20 62.75 23.86 65.47 25.54
% White 51.13 24.95 54.34 25.01 53.09 25.45 52.38 24.98 39.70 21.79
log(Earnings) 602.34 55.64 614.01 53.51 614.91 51.40 600.81 57.07 601.47 54.08
% Higher education 2.42 2.18 2.66 2.32 2.65 2.34 2.35 2.13 2.36 2.50
% Illiterate 41.46 12.15 39.20 11.57 38.76 10.98 41.62 12.56 42.09 12.72
Labor force participation 54.92 8.45 55.94 8.09 56.10 8.05 54.98 8.87 55.08 6.58
North 0.08 0.27 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.07
Northeast 0.32 0.47 0.22 0.42 0.22 0.41 0.34 0.47 0.53 0.50
South 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.06 0.23
Southeast 0.33 0.47 0.38 0.48 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.41 0.49
Midwest 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.00 0.00
Number of obs. 9679 2555 5418 3073 893
Notes: Outcome variables are from FINBRA-STN. All demographic and geographic covariates are obtained from
Brazil’s National Beareau of Statistics - Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Data on municipal
GDP is from the publication Produto Interno Bruto dos Municípios 2002-2016(IBGE, 2010). Population comes from
the 2000 and 2010 Census and from the publication Estimativas da População (IBGE, 2018) in non-census years. All
other demographic variables come from the 2000 and 2010 Census.
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Appendix C Design assessment
Table C.1: Covariate balance tests: Difference in municipality characteristics between left and
non-left mayors, by left margin of victory
All +/- 40 +/- 10 +/- 5 +/- 2.5 baseline RD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(Population) 19.80 3.17 1.38 -1.82 -2.96 -0.14
( 2.35) ( 2.52) ( 3.38) ( 4.57) ( 6.55) ( 0.47)
% Urban 0.97 -0.15 -0.65 -1.29 -1.27 -0.24
( 0.47) ( 0.53) ( 0.74) ( 1.00) ( 1.42) ( 0.22)
% White -3.09 -1.30 -0.69 -0.56 -0.03 -0.05
( 0.50) ( 0.57) ( 0.82) ( 1.13) ( 1.65) ( 0.20)
log(Earnings) -1.84 -0.74 -0.07 -0.22 0.89 -0.28
( 1.08) ( 1.24) ( 1.80) ( 2.47) ( 3.60) ( 0.65)
% Higher education 0.09 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.04
( 0.04) ( 0.05) ( 0.07) ( 0.09) ( 0.13) ( 0.03)
% Illiterate 0.34 0.14 -0.00 -0.02 -0.41 -0.13
( 0.24) ( 0.28) ( 0.40) ( 0.55) ( 0.78) ( 0.17)
Labor force -0.53 -0.03 0.18 0.29 0.42 0.17
participation ( 0.17) ( 0.20) ( 0.29) ( 0.40) ( 0.59) ( 0.16)
North -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Northeast 0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.03) ( 0.04)
South -0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.03) ( 0.03)
Southeast 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.03) ( 0.03)
Midwest -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Observations (all) 16423 8689 3858 2060 1029 9619
Observations (effective) 16423 8689 3858 2060 1029 6560
Notes: Standard errors clustered by municipality. Column 6 employs our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using
the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014) and controlling for city-year fixed effects.
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Figure C.1: Tests of manipulation of the left margin of victory
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point estimate 95% C.I.
Notes: The figure present visual evidence for the Cattaneo et al. (2018) manipulation test. The null hypothesis is
that there is no discontinuity in the distribution of the running variable at the cutoff. T-stat = -0.68; P-value = 0.49.
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Appendix D Dynamic Effects
Table D.1: RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor - dynamic effects baseline
Outcome Overall mandate Dynamics
4-year avg. 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita -0.21 -0.02 -0.02 0.21 -0.37
( 0.53) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.67) ( 0.73)
Expenditure, % of GDP -0.02 0.11 0.16 -0.46 0.01
( 0.21) ( 0.15) ( 0.18) ( 0.72) ( 0.18)
Revenue per capita 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 0.31 0.95
( 0.49) ( 0.02) ( 0.03) ( 0.69) ( 0.94)
Revenue, % of GDP 0.09 0.30 0.33 -0.38 0.25
( 0.23) ( 0.19) ( 0.20) ( 0.74) ( 0.21)
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure -0.03 0.23 0.22 -0.21 -0.24
( 0.18) ( 0.27) ( 0.28) ( 0.23) ( 0.29)
Public Investment 0.05 -0.21 -0.22 0.24 0.20
( 0.18) ( 0.26) ( 0.25) ( 0.24) ( 0.29)
Personnel 0.09 -0.00 0.53 -0.08 -0.11
( 0.20) ( 0.31) ( 0.28) ( 0.24) ( 0.28)
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 0.60 0.06 0.52 0.91 0.95
( 0.20) ( 0.28) ( 0.29) ( 0.29) ( 0.32)
of which:
Health & sanitation 0.21 -0.11 0.10 0.44 0.58
( 0.14) ( 0.22) ( 0.19) ( 0.21) ( 0.20)
Education & culture 0.19 0.16 0.31 0.14 0.25
( 0.15) ( 0.21) ( 0.22) ( 0.19) ( 0.20)
Social welfare 0.09 -0.02 0.10 0.12 0.09
( 0.05) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.06)
Other expenditures:
Housing -0.18 -0.20 -0.14 0.01 -0.31
( 0.13) ( 0.20) ( 0.19) ( 0.16) ( 0.20)
Transportation -0.15 -0.20 -0.24 -0.17 -0.11
( 0.09) ( 0.14) ( 0.13) ( 0.12) ( 0.13)
Other -0.15 0.21 -0.07 -0.53 -0.54
( 0.20) ( 0.24) ( 0.29) ( 0.29) ( 0.36)
Social Expenditures per capita 1.07 -0.01 -0.01 2.17 1.32
( 0.60) ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.80) ( 0.90)
Observations (all) 9679 9679 9679 9679 9679
Observations (effective) 4898 4611 4726 4776 4804
Notes: Estimates from our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Robust and bias-corrected standard errors clustered by
municipality in parenthesis.
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Table D.2: RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor - dynamic effects lameduck
Outcome Overall mandate Dynamics
4-year avg. 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita 1.04 0.03 0.02 0.74 0.06
( 1.18) ( 0.03) ( 0.04) ( 1.48) ( 1.55)
Expenditure, % of GDP -0.70 0.54 0.15 -3.72 0.34
( 1.10) ( 0.36) ( 0.34) ( 4.19) ( 0.35)
Revenue per capita 0.91 0.02 0.02 1.28 0.06
( 1.14) ( 0.04) ( 0.05) ( 1.51) ( 1.52)
Revenue, % of GDP -0.81 -0.03 0.35 -3.90 0.14
( 1.11) ( 0.39) ( 0.39) ( 4.28) ( 0.39)
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure -0.29 -0.51 -0.20 -0.53 0.02
( 0.37) ( 0.52) ( 0.63) ( 0.52) ( 0.55)
Public Investment 0.26 0.52 -0.02 0.35 -0.13
( 0.36) ( 0.52) ( 0.67) ( 0.51) ( 0.55)
Personnel -0.37 -0.59 0.14 -0.52 -0.59
( 0.41) ( 0.52) ( 0.55) ( 0.52) ( 0.58)
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 0.97 0.45 0.72 1.73 2.01
( 0.37) ( 0.49) ( 0.52) ( 0.60) ( 0.72)
of which:
Health & sanitation 0.75 0.36 0.76 1.00 1.48
( 0.24) ( 0.39) ( 0.45) ( 0.45) ( 0.46)
Education & culture 0.04 -0.09 -0.07 0.23 0.78
( 0.25) ( 0.41) ( 0.35) ( 0.35) ( 0.58)
Social welfare 0.22 0.28 0.20 0.29 0.18
( 0.10) ( 0.14) ( 0.15) ( 0.14) ( 0.12)
Other expenditures:
Housing -0.37 -0.26 -0.30 -0.58 -0.32
( 0.29) ( 0.40) ( 0.41) ( 0.41) ( 0.45)
Transportation -0.16 -0.09 -0.12 0.03 -0.37
( 0.18) ( 0.27) ( 0.29) ( 0.26) ( 0.32)
Other -0.63 -0.20 -0.54 -1.04 -1.91
( 0.34) ( 0.51) ( 0.50) ( 0.65) ( 0.80)
Social Expenditures per capita 3.28 0.02 0.02 5.10 1.61
( 1.29) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 1.90) ( 2.97)
Observations (all) 2555 2555 2555 2555 2555
Observations (effective) 1345 1344 1316 1299 1211
Notes: Estimates from our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Robust and bias-corrected standard errors clustered by
municipality in parenthesis.
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Table D.3: RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor - dynamic effects oil windfall
Outcome Overall mandate Dynamics
4-year avg. 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita 2.52 -0.00 0.02 3.58 3.42
( 2.11) ( 0.05) ( 0.11) ( 2.91) ( 2.74)
Expenditure, % of GDP -0.61 -0.17 -0.48 -0.84 -0.68
( 0.46) ( 0.53) ( 0.74) ( 0.54) ( 0.73)
Revenue per capita 1.87 0.02 0.01 3.61 -0.22
( 2.05) ( 0.08) ( 0.13) ( 2.25) ( 2.80)
Revenue, % of GDP -0.74 0.41 -0.84 -0.82 -1.43
( 0.47) ( 0.60) ( 0.75) ( 0.58) ( 0.79)
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure 0.33 0.08 1.22 -0.84 1.22
( 0.60) ( 0.78) ( 0.95) ( 0.86) ( 0.96)
Public Investment -0.39 -0.06 -1.21 0.73 -1.27
( 0.61) ( 0.84) ( 1.00) ( 0.83) ( 0.95)
Personnel 1.44 0.15 1.68 0.41 2.47
( 0.79) ( 0.89) ( 1.13) ( 1.09) ( 1.11)
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 2.36 0.68 2.00 2.26 4.38
( 0.91) ( 1.12) ( 1.20) ( 0.98) ( 2.06)
of which:
Health & sanitation 1.17 -0.34 1.11 1.61 1.58
( 0.56) ( 0.74) ( 0.76) ( 0.70) ( 0.86)
Education & culture 1.10 1.12 0.96 0.70 2.17
( 0.54) ( 0.85) ( 0.72) ( 0.54) ( 1.25)
Social welfare 0.07 -0.12 -0.09 0.02 0.26
( 0.19) ( 0.26) ( 0.31) ( 0.28) ( 0.23)
Other expenditures:
Housing -0.14 -0.02 -0.24 -0.42 -0.03
( 0.51) ( 0.63) ( 0.79) ( 0.74) ( 0.72)
Transportation -0.47 -0.44 -0.56 -0.27 -0.41
( 0.20) ( 0.30) ( 0.38) ( 0.28) ( 0.28)
Other -1.51 -0.23 -1.18 -1.53 -3.72
( 1.04) ( 1.33) ( 1.34) ( 1.07) ( 2.29)
Social Expenditures per capita 7.98 -0.01 0.01 6.59 6.23
( 2.71) ( 0.03) ( 0.04) ( 2.96) ( 2.95)
Observations (all) 893 893 893 893 893
Observations (effective) 484 556 476 464 453
Notes: Estimates from our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Robust and bias-corrected standard errors clustered by
municipality in parenthesis.
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Appendix E Robustness tests
Table E.1: RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor - by city size
Outcome (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita -0.21 -0.50 0.14 0.68 0.97
( 0.53) ( 0.61) ( 0.73) ( 1.10) ( 1.73)
Expenditure, % of GDP -0.02 -0.16 0.02 0.18 0.16
( 0.21) ( 0.26) ( 0.16) ( 0.18) ( 0.23)
Revenue per capita 0.16 -0.12 0.06 -0.18 0.17
( 0.49) ( 0.56) ( 0.63) ( 0.96) ( 1.39)
Revenue, % of GDP 0.09 -0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02
( 0.23) ( 0.27) ( 0.15) ( 0.17) ( 0.23)
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure -0.03 0.10 0.05 -0.03 0.01
( 0.18) ( 0.19) ( 0.23) ( 0.33) ( 0.57)
Public Investment 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.18 -0.17
( 0.18) ( 0.18) ( 0.22) ( 0.29) ( 0.64)
Personnel 0.09 0.22 0.52 0.32 0.75
( 0.20) ( 0.22) ( 0.28) ( 0.40) ( 0.67)
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 0.60 0.65 0.56 0.49 0.50
( 0.20) ( 0.23) ( 0.29) ( 0.41) ( 0.82)
of which:
Health & sanitation 0.21 0.22 0.06 0.17 -0.16
( 0.14) ( 0.17) ( 0.22) ( 0.33) ( 0.58)
Education & culture 0.19 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.63
( 0.15) ( 0.17) ( 0.23) ( 0.26) ( 0.47)
Social welfare 0.09 0.11 0.03 0.03 -0.10
( 0.05) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.09) ( 0.14)
Other expenditures:
Housing -0.18 -0.29 -0.31 -0.23 0.22
( 0.13) ( 0.16) ( 0.18) ( 0.24) ( 0.48)
Transportation -0.15 -0.18 -0.21 -0.32 -0.21
( 0.09) ( 0.10) ( 0.11) ( 0.15) ( 0.24)
Other -0.15 -0.13 0.04 0.15 -0.39
( 0.20) ( 0.25) ( 0.29) ( 0.42) ( 0.82)
Social Expenditures per capita 1.07 0.75 1.20 1.75 1.92
( 0.60) ( 0.66) ( 0.75) ( 1.12) ( 1.89)
Observations (all) 9679 7259 4839 2419 967
Observations (effective) 4898 3847 2620 1283 541
Baseline sample ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Population > 25th pct (6337) ✓
Population > median (13787.5) ✓
Population > 75th pct (30007.25) ✓
Population > 90th pct (73400.5) ✓
Notes: Estimates from our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Outcomes measured as 4-year averages over a mayoral
term. Robust and bias-corrected standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis.
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Table E.2: RD estimates of the effect of a left-wing mayor: robustness to alternative bandwith
selection
Outcome
Baseline Lame Duck Tiebout Tiebout Oil windfall
< median <25th perc.
MSE CER MSE CER MSE CER MSE CER MSE CER
Size of government: overall revenues and expenses
Expenditure per capita -0.21 -0.03 1.04 1.27 -1.19 -1.04 -0.91 -1.07 2.52 3.34
( 0.53) ( 0.57) ( 1.18) ( 1.16) ( 0.70) ( 0.75) ( 0.90) ( 0.95) ( 2.11) ( 2.22)
Expenditure, % of GDP -0.02 0.01 -0.70 -0.59 -0.16 -0.21 -0.56 -0.63 -0.61 -0.42
( 0.21) ( 0.20) ( 1.10) ( 1.10) ( 0.33) ( 0.36) ( 0.51) ( 0.59) ( 0.46) ( 0.46)
Revenue per capita 0.16 0.49 0.91 1.29 -0.41 -0.09 0.38 0.68 1.87 2.73
( 0.49) ( 0.53) ( 1.14) ( 1.14) ( 0.74) ( 0.82) ( 1.10) ( 1.21) ( 2.05) ( 2.17)
Revenue, % of GDP 0.09 0.20 -0.81 -0.76 0.06 0.05 -0.25 -0.28 -0.74 -0.48
( 0.23) ( 0.21) ( 1.11) ( 1.12) ( 0.37) ( 0.39) ( 0.57) ( 0.65) ( 0.47) ( 0.48)
Allocation of resources: budget categories (% of total expenditure)
Current Expenditure -0.03 -0.02 -0.29 -0.20 -0.02 -0.01 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.46
( 0.18) ( 0.20) ( 0.37) ( 0.40) ( 0.23) ( 0.25) ( 0.34) ( 0.37) ( 0.60) ( 0.62)
Public Investment 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.16 0.11 0.08 -0.29 -0.36 -0.39 -0.45
( 0.18) ( 0.19) ( 0.36) ( 0.39) ( 0.20) ( 0.22) ( 0.34) ( 0.38) ( 0.61) ( 0.63)
Personnel 0.09 0.03 -0.37 -0.34 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.09 1.44 1.65
( 0.20) ( 0.22) ( 0.41) ( 0.45) ( 0.23) ( 0.25) ( 0.33) ( 0.36) ( 0.79) ( 0.84)
Allocation of resources: functional categories (% of total expenditure)
Social Expenditures 0.60 0.67 0.97 1.05 0.92 0.98 0.45 0.61 2.36 2.68
( 0.20) ( 0.22) ( 0.37) ( 0.40) ( 0.27) ( 0.31) ( 0.35) ( 0.39) ( 0.91) ( 0.99)
of which:
Health & sanitation 0.21 0.26 0.75 0.77 0.61 0.53 0.49 0.57 1.17 1.21
( 0.14) ( 0.16) ( 0.24) ( 0.27) ( 0.21) ( 0.24) ( 0.27) ( 0.31) ( 0.56) ( 0.59)
Education & culture 0.19 0.27 0.04 -0.03 -0.00 0.08 -0.20 -0.08 1.10 1.17
( 0.15) ( 0.16) ( 0.25) ( 0.27) ( 0.19) ( 0.21) ( 0.30) ( 0.33) ( 0.54) ( 0.59)
Social welfare 0.09 0.06 0.22 0.28 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09
( 0.05) ( 0.06) ( 0.10) ( 0.11) ( 0.07) ( 0.08) ( 0.09) ( 0.10) ( 0.19) ( 0.21)
Other Expenditures:
Housing -0.18 -0.19 -0.37 -0.43 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.24
( 0.13) ( 0.14) ( 0.29) ( 0.32) ( 0.18) ( 0.20) ( 0.25) ( 0.27) ( 0.51) ( 0.55)
Transportation -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.12 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.02 -0.47 -0.49
( 0.09) ( 0.10) ( 0.18) ( 0.20) ( 0.12) ( 0.13) ( 0.16) ( 0.18) ( 0.20) ( 0.21)
Other 1.07 1.44 3.28 3.79 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.38 7.98 8.22
( 0.60) ( 0.67) ( 1.29) ( 1.30) ( 0.77) ( 0.83) ( 1.12) ( 1.19) ( 2.71) ( 3.11)
Social Expenditures per capita 1.07 1.44 3.28 3.79 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.38 7.98 8.22
( 0.60) ( 0.67) ( 1.29) ( 1.30) ( 0.77) ( 0.83) ( 1.12) ( 1.19) ( 2.71) ( 3.11)
Observations (all) 9679 9679 2555 2555 5418 5418 3073 3073 893 893
Observations (effective) 4898 3497 1345 1015 3173 2395 2129 1704 484 389
Notes: Estimates from our baseline RD specification (equation 2), using the bias-corrected procedure of Calonico
et al. (2014) and controlling for city and year fixed effects. Outcomes measured as 4-year averages over a mayoral
term. Robust and bias-corrected standard errors clustered by municipality in parenthesis.
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Appendix F Placebo exercise by subsamples
Figure F.1: Falsification test using placebo thresholds - effect on social expenditure share
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Notes: Empirical distribution of t-statistics from our RD estimates (equation 2) of the effect of a left-wing mayor on
the share of social spending, based on 200 randomly-drawn placebo thresholds, drawn separately on the left and on
the right side of the true threshold (100 on each side), using only observations belonging to that side and with at least
25 observations on each side of the bandwidth. Vertical line = t-statistics obtained using the true threshold. The
t-statistics are from the robust bias-corrected procedure of Calonico et al. (2014).
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